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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
THERMOID WESTERN CO., NOR-
MAN THOMPSON LUMBER & 
HARDWARE CO., INC., UTAH 
POULTRY & FARMERS COOP-
ERATIVE, UTAH LUMBER CO., 
and STOKERMATIC CO., on their 
own behalf and on behalf of other 
persons, corporations, and associa-
tions similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs arnd Appella;nts, 
vs. 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COM-
PANY, THE DENVER AND RIO 
GRANDE WESTERN RAIL-
ROAD COMPANY, THE WEST-
ERN PACIFIC COMPANY and 
BAMBERGER RAILROAD COM-
PANY, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case 
No. 9324 
BRIEF O·F RESP·ONDENT·s 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action to recover amounts paid by plain-
tiffs, representing a general increase of 15 per cent in 
freight rates on traffic moving \vholly within the State of 
Utah between June 22, 1956, and August 28, 1958. 
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2 
The Interstate Commerce Commission will be some-
times referred to herein as I.C.C. and the Public Service 
Commission of Utah as P.S.C.U. Emphasis is supplied 
unless otherwise indica ted. 
Defendants and respondents can only agree partially 
with appellants' Statement of the Case and Statement of 
Facts as contained in plaintiffs' brief. In appellants' "In-
troduction'' as well as throughout the majority of ap-
pellants' brief counsel assumes and states as fact the 
main point in issue. He assumes that the I.C.C. order 
was void and that the ''proper and valid charges'' were 
the lower rates for which he contends, although the rates 
as increased pursuant to the I.C.C. order were "the tar-
iffs on file with'' the P.S.C.U. The question of the va-
lidity and effect of the I.C.C. order pursuant to which 
tariffs setting such rates or charges were filed with the 
P.S.C.U., is the most important and controlling question 
which must be here decided. 
Appellants refer to the decision of the United States 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Structural Steel & Forge Co. 
v. Unrion Pacific RR., 269 F. 2d 714, saying such court held 
that there was no federal question involved. Reference 
to the opinion in thaf case will show that the court held 
merely that a removable case had not been stated in the 
complaint, in spite of the fact that plaintiff had referred 
to the I.C.C. order and characterized it as void. That 
court said at page 718: 
''Stripped of its irrelevancies, the removed 
claim is that the defendant railroads exacted a 
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rate for intrastatP shipments in exress of those 
established and on file with the competent statP 
regulatory body, and the prayer is for restitution 
of the same. • • • The reference then to the void 
or vacated order of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission as a basis for the charges, was not an 
essential ingredient of the claim for restitution. 
As a gratuitous anticipation of a defense founded 
in federal law, it will not suffice to confer federal 
court jurisdiction. • • •.'' 
Although the reference to the I.C.C. order may not 
have been essential in plaintiff's pleadings and therefore 
gave no basis for removal, nevertheless the effect of that 
I. C. C. order and whether or not it was void is ''an essen-
tial ingredient of the claim for restitution'' and is fun-
damental to plaintiff's right to recover. 
The Circuit Court held that the validity of the I.C.C. 
order was a matter of defense and further stated: "But 
even though a valid rate order does emerge to ultimately 
condition the right of recovery in these actions • • • at 
most, federal law lurks in the background to determine 
the result of this litigation.'' 
It is thus defendant's position that federal law, which 
must be referred to in order to determine the validity and 
effect of the I.C.C. order and whether or not it was void 
ab initio ''must determine the result of this litigation.'' 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
During the Second World War and the years fol-
lowing, with the resulting inflationary spiral, the entire 
United States - including the State of Utah - expe-
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rienced successive and repeated increases in wages and 
costs in materials; in costs of living and costs of doing 
business generally. As these increased costs of operating 
a business pyramided one upon another, the railroads 
had to make successive requests of the I.C.C. and the 
various state commissions for authority to increase their 
rates and charges to meet such increased costs. With 
respect to interstate traffic the proceedings were not 
adversary proceedings but were designated by what is 
known as "ex parte" numbers. In the case at bar there 
will be six of these ex parte proceedings referred to. These 
are Ex Parte 162, Ex Parte 166, Ex Parte 168, Ex Parte 
175, Ex Parte 196 and Ex Parte 206. In each ex parte 
proceeding the I.C.C. after lengthy investigative hear-
ings ordered increases in freight rates on interstate com-
merce. In comparable proceedings the railroads asked 
the P.S.C.U. for similar increases within the State of 
Utah. The P.S.C.U. granted some in Ex Parte 162 and 
166, denied others, and completely denied the increases 
asked comparable to those granted in Ex Parte 168. In 
denying the latter increase, the Utah Commission stated 
that the evidence did not ''afford the commission sufficient 
information upon which it can determine whether or not 
the revenue derived by the railroads from Utah intrastate 
traffic is inadequate,'' or whether it would or would not 
justify the requested increase. (See Exhibit 7, page 3.) 
Upon such denial the railroads made application to 
the I.C.C., asking the I.C.C. to investigate such rates 
pursuant to the provisions of the Interstate Commerce 
Act, 49 U.S.C. 13 (3) ( 4). After such 13th Section investi-
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gation the I.C.C. found that intrastate rates discrimi-
nated against interstate rates and directed the P.S.C.U. to 
authorize increases intrastate up to the level of Ex Parte 
168 interstate increases in absence of which P.S.C.U. 
action the I.C.C. itself would issue an order requiring 
such increases. The P.S.C.U. made no finding as to jus-
tification for such increases other than referring to the 
I.C.C. findings and directions and, pursuant thereto, the 
P.S.C.U. authorized the increases intrastate "'"hich had 
theretofore been denied by them up to the Ex Parte 168 
level. (See Exhibit 8.) 
Later, interstate rates were further increased by the 
I.C.C. in an additional amount of 15 per cent in Ex Parte 
175. The P.S.C.U. in corollary proceedings again refused 
to authorize the further increases. In so refusing, they 
stated exactly as they had done in the prior case -that 
they did not consider the evidence sufficient to enable 
them to determine whether or not the increases were 
justified. (See Exhibit 2C, page 43.) 
At the request of the railroads the I. C. C. again under-
took an investigation pursuant to Section 13 (3) ( 4) of 
the Interstate Commerce Act, in a proceeding designated 
by its Docket Number 31484 and found discrimination 
resulting from existing Utah intrastate rates and again 
directed the P.S.C.U. to authorize the increases, in ab-
sence of which the I.C.C. would order them into effect. 
(See Exhibit 9.) This time the P.S.C.U. declined to order 
the increases, and under date of February 8, 1956, the 
I. C. C. issued its order (Exhibit 10) requiring the increases 
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to be put into effect on intrastate traffic within the State 
of Utah. This is the order under attack in the case at bar. 
Tariffs providing for such increases were duly published 
and filed with the Public Service Commission of Utah 
and stamped as received and ''filed'' by the Commission. 
(See K-19-Sheet 14 of Exhibit 4.) Under the tariff so 
filed pursuant to such I.C.C. order, increased intrastate 
rates became effective June 22, 1956. Court proceedings 
as referred to by plaintiff were undertaken, and in Pub-
lic Service Commission of Utah v. United States, 356 U.S. 
421, 2 L.Ed. 2d 886, 78 S. Ct. 796, the United States Su-
preme Court held the evidence to be deficient in certain 
particulars and entered its decision directing that the 
I.C.C. order of February 8, 1956, be set aside and that 
the matter be remanded to the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission "for further proceedings in conformity with" 
the Supreme Court's opinion. 
Immediately upon entry of judgment by the Federal 
District Court remanding the matter to the I.C.C. for 
''further proceedings'' this case was filed by plaintiffs 
herein based upon the assumption - not otherwise proven 
or shown - that the I.C.C. Report (Ex. 9) and Order 
(Ex. 10) were entirely void ab initio. 
During the two-year interim, as a result of increased 
wages and costs, further increases had been ordered by 
the I. C. C. in Ex Parte 196 and Ex Parte 206. Comparable 
requests had been filed with the P.S.C.U., "~hich the 
P.S.C.U. did not even set for hearing. On remand to the 
I.C.C. by the United States District Court for the District 
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of Utah pursuant to the Supreme Court's direction for 
"further proceedings consistent with" its opinion, fur-
ther hearings were conducted by the I.C.C. and consoli-
dated with additional 13th Section hearings on Ex Parte 
196 and Ex Parte 206 increases as they affected Utah 
intrastate traffic. After such further hearing the I.C.U., 
under date of December 7, 1959, issued its further report, 
finding discrimination still to exist and directing that in-
creases be allowed by the P.S.C.U. (See Exhibit 11.) 
When the P.S.C.U. declined, the I.C.C., under date of 
March 17, 1960, issued its order directing such increases 
to be made effective on Utah intrastate traffic as of May 
13, 1960 (Exhibit 12). This latter order is now under 
consideration by a three-judge federal court for the Dis-
trict of Utah. 
Counsel for plaintiff in his Statement of Facts stated, 
re I.C.C. Docket No. 31484, "After hearing, the Interstate 
Commerce Commission issued its order taking jurisdic·-
tion of the Utah intrastate rates and granting the in-
creases sought.'' He thereby attempts to mislead the 
court. Not only at that point but several other places in 
his brief he refers to the I.C.C. "taking jurisdiction" 
of intrastate rates. Nowhere in any investigation by the 
I.C.C. or any order issued by it has there been any state-
ment that it was "taking jurisdiction" of intrastate rates. 
In no law on the subject is there any reference to ''taking 
jurisdiction'' and no case has referred in terms to '' tak-
ing jurisdiction.'' In this particular case the I. C. C. issued 
no ''order taking jurisdiction.'' On ''petition of the car-
riers concerned'' ( 49 U.S. C. 13 ( 3)) it undertook an "in-
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vestigation'' as Section 13 of the Act imposed a duty on 
it to do. On the first page of its report (Exhibit 9) it 
states, ''This proceeding is an investigation under Sec-
tion 13 of the Interstate Commerce Act into the lawful-
ness of Utah intrastate freight rates and charges.'' In 
that investigation it held a full hearing and "made find-
ings'' as the federal act directs it to do. It found dis-
crimination, and in a subsequent document (Exhibit 10) 
it ordered the increases to remove the discrimination. No-
where, and at no time, was there any "order taking juris-
diction,'' and the increased rates did not become effective 
automatically by virtue of its order but only upon publi-
cation of tariffs which were "filed" with, and stamped 
"filed" by the P.S.C.U. (K19, Exhibit 4, Sheet 14) 
Again, on page 7, appellant states, "The mandate of 
the Supreme Court was filed in the United States District 
Court on August 27, 1958, on which date the Utah intra-
state rates 'reverted' to their former level.'' The rates 
did not so automatically revert, but the increases had to 
be cancelled by the filing of a supplemental tariff, which, 
upon judgment of the federal court, \vas issued, pub-
lished and "filed" with the P.S.C.U. (K36, Sheet 2 of 
Exhibit 4) 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT ONE 
THE I.C.C. HAD AMPLE JURISDICTION 
AND ACTED WITHIN ITS JURISDICTION 
IN ISSUING ITS ORDER OF FEBRUARY 8, 
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1956 (EXHIBIT 10), AKD SUCII ORDER 
\\r AS NOT VOID Bl~rr, AT 1IOST, SUBJECT 
rro BEING C~ANCELLED AND SET ASIDE, 
AND THEREFORE VOIDABLE. 
POINT TWO 
THE TARIFFS CHARGED AND ( 10L-
LECTED BY THE DEFENDANT RAIL-
ROADS DURING THE PERIOD IN QUES-
TION WERE EFFECTIVELY ''FILED'' 
AND WERE THE TARIFFS ''ON FILE AND 
IN EFFECT'' AND HAD TO BE COMPLIED 
WITH UNDER BOTH FEDERAL AND 
UTAH STATE LAW. 
POINT THREE 
THE FURTHER FINDINGS AND REPORT 
OF THE I.C.C. OF DECE11BER, 1959 SUP-
PLEMENT AND SUPPORT THE ORIGINAL 
FINDINGS ON WHICH THE ORDER OF 
FEBRUARY 8, 1956, WAS BASED AND DE-
TAIL EVIDENCE WHICH THE SUPRE1'1E 
COURT SAID WAS LACKING. 
POINT FOUR 
APPLICATION TO THE PUBLIC SERV-
ICE C01I1IISSION OF UTAH FOR REP A-
RATIONS IS A PREREQUISITE TO ANY 
RIGHT OF REPARATION OR RESTITU-
TION, REG_._\RDLESS OF THE EFFECT OF 
ANY I.C.C. ORDER. 
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POINT FIVE 
PLAINTIFFS HAVE NO BASIS IN EQUITY 
FOR ANY RECOVERY. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE I.C.C. HAD AMPLE JURISDICTION 
AND ACTED WITHIN ITS JURISDICTION 
IN ISSUING ITS ORDER OF FEBRUARY 8, 
1956 (EXHIBIT 10), AND SUCH ORDER 
WAS NOT VOID BUT, AT MOST, SUBJECT 
TO BEING C.ANCELLED AND SET ASIDE, 
AND THEREFORE VOIDABLE. 
For purposes of argument appellants combined their 
Point One and Point Two as stated, and respondents have 
thus combined the two in their statement of Point One. 
Appellant states that the I.C.C. ''was without juris-
diction to enter the contested order'' and that ''such order 
was void from its inception.'' Having so stated, counsel 
throughout the major portion of plaintiff's brief assumes 
such point to have been proved and argues as to the effect 
of void orders or void judgments. The statements from 
American Jurisprudence and Corpus Juris Secundum 
therefore beg the issue, because they merely refer to the 
effect of void orders, but before such statements can be 
applicable it must be shown that any order in question 
is void. If it is an order which is "liable to be vacated or 
set aside for irregularity or other cause,'' then, as stated 
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in 49 C.J.S. 878, it is "merely voidable" and the order 
in question here as sho\\·n by the very course of the pro-
ceedings was one which was ''liable to be vacated or set 
aside for irregularity or other cause" and therefore, at 
most, voidable. If it was void from its inception, it could 
have been disregarded completely and the Supreme Court 
would have so stated and there would have been no rea-
son for the Supreme Court to set it aside nor to refer the 
matter back to the I. C. C. "for further proceedings." 
Counsel refers to the case of Houston E. & TV. T. Ry. 
Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 58 L.Ed. 1341, 34 S. Ct. 
833. This is normally referred to as the ''Shreveport 
Case.'' Again counsel states that there the court held that 
the I.C.C. "could take jurisdiction" of intrastate freight 
rates. No such holding nor wording is used anywhere in 
that case. In that case railroad rates for movement of 
traffic between points wholly within Texas were lower 
than for similar traffic movements interstate between 
Texas points and Shreveport, Louisiana. This discrimi-
nation affected competition in commerce to and from 
Shreveport. The I.C.C. found that the interstate rates 
between Shreveport and Texas points were unjust and 
unreasonably high, and its order specified maximum 
rates above which the carriers could not go. There were 
some commodity rates in Texas \vhich required lower 
charges for movement in one direction than for move-
ment of a similar commodity in an opposite direction. The 
effect of the I.C.C. order was to allow the railroads to 
increase within Texas the lesser of these commodity rates 
and to reduce interstate rates between Texas and Shreve-
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port to the higher of these Texas commodity rates. This 
thus had the effect of increasing some intrastate rates. 
On this point it was contended that Congress had no au-
thority to control intrastate traffic and intrastate rates 
and that the I.C.C. had no authority to issue any order 
affecting the level of intrastate rates. The word "juris-
diction'' was not mentioned. 
In sustaining the power of Congress and the author-
ity of the I.C.C., the United States Supreme Court said 
that the essence of power given to Congress to regulate 
commerce among the several states was such that (page 
350) ''interstate trade was not left to be destroyed or 
impeded by the rivalries of local governments.'' 
Page 353: 
''Congress in the exercise of its paramount 
power may prevent the common instrumentalities 
of interstate and intrastate commercial inter-
course from being used in their intrastate opera-
tions to the injury of interstate commerce. 
"* * * We find no reason to doubt that Con-
gress is entitled to keep the highways of inter-
state communication open to interstate traffic upon 
fair and equal terms. * * * The use of the instru-
ments of interstate commerce in a discriminatory 
manner so as to inflict injury upon that commerce, 
or some part thereof, furnishes abundant ground 
for federal intervention. Nor can the attempted 
exercise of state authority alter the matter, "\vhere 
Congress has acted, for a state may not authorize 
the carrier to do that "\vhich Congress is entitled 
to forbid and has forbidden.'' 
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I~ age :~;>;> : 
"• • • We conclude that the order of the 
commission now in question cannot be held invalid 
upon the ground that it exceeded the authoritv 
\\'" hich Congress could lawfully confer.'' ~ 
The court then referred to the provisions of the Inter-
state Commerce Act as it then existed and added 
(page 356): 
''This language is certainly sweeping enough 
to embrace all of the discriminations of the sort 
described which it was in the power of Congress 
to condemn.'' 
Page 358: 
''Here, the Commission expressly found that 
unjust discrimination existed under substantially 
similar conditions of transportation and the 
inquiry is whether the Commission had power to 
correct it. * * *. We are convinced that the au-
thority of the Commission was adequate.'' 
The cases of Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bou:les, 321 
U.S. 144, 88 L.Ed. 635, and Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 
U.S. 79, 84 L.Ed. 93, cited on pages 11 and 12 of plain-
tiffs' brief, are not in point. There are sufficient cases 
involving freight rates and proceedings by and before 
the I.C.C. to show controlling law in this matter and ap-
pellants cannot find support for their erroneous assump-
tions nor any comfort from such cases. 
The Davies Warehouse case involved the Federal 
Emergency Price Control Act. The question was whether 
or not the Davies Warehouse Co. was a public utility; if a 
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public utility, the provisions of the Federal Act itself said 
it would not come under nor be subject to the federal law 
at all. Warehouse business such as was carried on by the 
Davies Co. was declared to be a public utility both by the 
California Constitution and the California Public Utili-
ties Act. Therefore, the court did not hesitate in saying 
that the Emergency Price Control Administrator had no 
authority at all to deal in any way with warehouse rates as 
set by the California Public Utilities Commission. 
The cases of Palmer v. M(J)Ssachusetts, Yonkers v. 
U. S. 320 U.S. 685, 80 L.Ed. 400, and Alabama Public 
Service Commission v. Southern Ry Co., 341 U.S. 341, 
95 L.Ed. 1002, all involved discontinuance or abandonment 
of local train service with respect to which the I.C.C. had 
been given no jurisdiction or authority of any kind. Such 
cases cannot be considered in any way applicable to I. C. C. 
action in matters where the law specifically says that on 
request the I.C.C. shall make an investigation and issue 
findings. 
The case of Arkansas Railroad Commission v. Ch~­
cago, R.I. & P.R. R. Co., 274 U.S. 597, 71 L. Ed. 1224, did 
involve rates where the I.C.C., after hearing, had ordered 
increases in rates in Oklahoma, Texas and New Mexico, 
and without anything further and \Yith no hearing at all 
it ordered increases in Arkansas rates. Appellants can 
find nothing in that case to vary or dispute the law as set 
forth in Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Florida, 295 U.S. 
301, 79 L.Ed. 1451, 55 S. Ct. 713, referred to later in this 
brief, which case is directly parallel on its facts with the 
case at bar. 
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On page 11 of his brief counsel numbers as "1'' and 
'' 2'' questions which he says the Commission must de-
termine in every Section 13 case. He cites neither statute 
nor case law to support the position claimed by him, and 
neither the statute nor the cases pose any such questions 
in any such manner nor say anything about the I.C.C. 
''taking jurisdiction'' of intrastate rates. 
Section 13 of the Interstate Commerce Act is headed 
''Complaints to and Investigations by Commission,'' and 
provides, "It shall be the duty of the Commission to in-
vestigate the matters complained of." Subparagraph (3) 
of Section 13, under which these proceedings are insti-
tuted, authorizes a petition to be filed by any carrier re-
questing an investigation, and requires the Commission 
to notify the state or states interested of the proceedings. 
Subparagraph (4) provides that whenever in such an 
investigation the Commission after full hearing finds any 
undue, unreasonable or unjust discrimination against, or 
undue burden on interstate commerce, ''it shall prescribe 
the rate • "" • thereafter to be charged, in such manner as, 
in its judgment, will remove such * * • discrimination.'' 
Now here is the word ''Jurisdiction'' used. 
There is no question, and at this date it cannot be 
doubted but what Congress was within its rights in enact-
ing such legislation and the validity of such legislation 
has been many times upheld. Florida v. United States, 
282 U.S. 194 @ 210, 75 L.Ed. 291, 51 S. Ct. 119, ''The 
power of the Congress to authorize the Interstate Com-
merce Commission to establish intrastate rates in order 
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to remove an unjust discrimination against interstate 
commerce is not open to dispute.'' (See Wisconsin R. R. 
Commission v. C. B. & Q. R. R. Co., 257 U.S. 563, 66 L.Ed. 
371, 42 St. Ct. 232; Florida v. United States, 292 U. S. 
1, 78 L.Ed. 1077, 54 S. Ct. 603; King v. Un.ited States, 
344 U.S. 254, 97 L.Ed. 301, 73 S. Ct. 259; Atlantic Coastline 
R. Co. v. Florida, 295 U.S. 301, 79 L.Ed. 1451, 55 
S. Ct. 713). 
An analysis of this federal law clearly demonstrates 
that carriers are entitled to request an investigation. On 
request, it is the duty of the I.C.C. to institute an investi-
gation. A full hearing was had and no argument has 
been, or could be made to the contrary. As a result of 
the hearing the I.C.C. made findings as it ''Tas required 
to do and found discrimination to exist. Under such cir-
cumstances there cannot be any valid argument that said 
Commission acted without or in excess of jurisdiction 
granted to it -in fact, imposed upon it -by federal law. 
The question of whether the I. C. C. may have erred in 
the exercise of that jurisdiction is another matter, but 
there is a difference between power and authority to act 
in the first instance and error that will subject such action 
to being set aside after that jurisdiction or authority 
granted has been pursued. Upon this point we "\Yould like 
to refer to the case of Atwood v. Co.r, 88 Utah 437, 55 P. 
2d 377, wherein this court distinguishes between lack of 
jurisdiction, which is referred to as "lack of power to 
proceed'' with a case, and acting erroneously where 
proper jurisdiction exists but where in such action a 
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court or other body may err in the exercise of that juris-
diction. The court refers to numerous definitions of jur-
isdiction and states: (at Page 447) 
'' 'Of the various definitions of jurisdiction 
perhaps the most satisfactory is as follows: Juris-
diction is authority to hear and determine a cause. 
Since jurisdiction is the power to hear and de-
termine, it does not, as will be pointed out later, 
depend upon the regularity of the exercise of that 
power or upon the rightfulness of the decisions 
made.' '' 
Page 450: 
" 'It cannot be said that if the court correctly 
decides a question he is acting within his jurisdic-
tion, but if he erroneously decides it and deter-
mines it contrary to the evidence he is acting with-
out jurisdiction.' '' 
In Wasatch Oil Refining Co. v. Wade, 92 Utah 50, 63 
P. 2d 1070, in upholding jurisdiction and refusing to grant 
requested prohibition, this Court again said: (at P. 60) 
'' * * * Jurisdiction does not depend upon the 
regularity of the exercise of power or on the right-
fulness or correctness of decisions made, but is the 
power to hear and determine the matter in hand.'' 
(Citing Atwood v. Cox) 
Page 71: 
'' * * * We are satisfied that the trial court has 
acted within jurisdiction and if it has proceeded 
wrongly that it has merely committed error which 
may be reviewed and corrected upon appeal.'' 
There is hardly any dissent from the law as above 
stated, and the Supreme Court of the United States has on 
various occasions repeated the same. In General Invest-
ment Co. v. New York Central R. Co., 271 U. S. 228, 70 
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L. Ed. 920, 46 S. Ct. 496, the Supreme Court stated: (at 
P. 230) 
'' * * * By jurisdiction we mean power to en-
tertain the suit, consider the merits and render a 
binding decision thereon; and by merits we mean 
the various elements which enter into or qualify 
the plaintiff's right to relief sought. There may 
be jurisdiction and yet an absence of merits. * * * 
Whether a plaintiff seeking such relief has the 
requisite standing is a question going to the mer-
its, and its determination is an exercise of juris-
diction. * * * If it be resolved against him the 
appropriate decree is a dismissal for want of 
merits, not for want of jurisdiction.'' 
The United States Supreme Court (356 U. S. 421), in 
passing on the I.C.C. order in question in the case at bar, 
did not declare the order to be void for want of jurisdic-
tion as it might have done had there been any question 
about jurisdiction, but it set the order aside and directed 
that the matter be referred back to the I.C.C. for further 
proceedings in the same matter. This clearly sho,vs that 
the Supreme Court had some question as to the ''merits'' 
of the case but not as to ''jurisdiction.'' 
In Thompson v. Terminal Shares, 89 F. 2d 652, the 
Eighth Circuit Court stated: 
''Jurisdiction does not depend upon the right-
fulness of the decision. It is not lost because of an 
erroneous decision, however erroneous that de-
cision may be. * * * In such case whether the 
court decided correctly or incorrectly could not 
affect the question of jurisdiction nor the duty of 
all person.s having notice to obey the order until 
reversed by a court of co1npetent jurisdic-
tion. * * *" 
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See also l~inderup v. Pathe E:rchauge, 2G3 U.S. 291, 
60 L.l1~d. 308, -l..t- S. Ct. 96; National Benefit Life Insurance 
Co. v. "'-;ha~t·-Jra.Zker Co., 111 F. 2d -!~ri, ( 1 ert. dPn. 311 U.S. 
673, 85 L.Ed. 4~~2, 61 S. Ct. 35; Ex Parte Roe, 234 lJ .S. 
70, 58 L.Ed. 1217, 34 S. Ct. 722. 
In lVest Coast Exploration Co. v. Mcl\ay, 213 F. 2d 
582, the court in the course of a long and learned opinion 
written by Chief Judge Harold M. Stevens stated: 
'' • • • A court is said to have jurisdiction, in 
the sense that its erroneous action is voidable only, 
not void, when the parties are properly hPfore it, 
the proceeding is a kind or r lass which the court 
is authorized to adjudicate and the claim set forth 
in the paper writing invoking the court's action is 
not obviously frivolous. * • *" 
Certiorari on that case was denied, 347 U.S. 989, 
98 L. Ed. 1123, 7 4 S. Ct. 850. See also Dix v. Dix, 222 
S.W. 2d 839 (Ky.). 
There is no question but what the I.C.C. had the 
power under the Interstate Commerce Act to undertake 
the investigation as it did and to issue the order which it 
issued. \"Vith respect to the issuance of such orders the 
Interstate Commerce Act further provides under Section 
15 that whenever in any such investigation after full 
hearing the Commission finds any rate to be discrimina-
tory, it is authorized and empowered to prescribe rates 
to be thereafter charged and to order that the carrier 
shall not thereafter charge any rate other than that so 
prescribed. 
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Subparagraph (2) of Section 15 of the Interstate 
Commerce Act reads : 
''Except as otherwise provided in this part, all 
orders of the Commission, other than orders for 
the payment of money, shall take effect within 
such reasonable time, not less than thirty days, 
and shaZl continue in force until its further order, 
or for a specified period of time, according as 
shall be prescribed in the order, unless the same 
shall be suspended or modified or set aside by the 
Commission or be suspended or set aside by a court 
of competent jurisdiction.'' 
This statutory provision very definitely contemplates 
that an order entered by the I. C. C. under the provisions of 
Section 13 may be suspended or set aside by the Com-
mission itself or may be suspended or set aside by a 
court of competent jurisdiction, but it specifically pro-
vides that the order "shall take affect" and "shall con-
tinue in force'' until or unless set aside by the Commis-
sion itself or "suspended or set aside by a court." From 
these provisions it cannot even be inferred that if there 
may be error in the receipt of evidence or in the findings 
or issuance of the order, that such order should be void 
and of no effect at all. The contrary is conclusively indi-
cated by such statute. It cannot be argued in the face of 
such a statute that the I.C.C. in any \Yay exceeded the 
power or authority granted to it by law in holding the 
hearing, making findings and issuing the orders as issued 
herein. (Exhibits 9, 10, 11 and 12) 
In the case at bar the order of the I.C.C. (Exhibit 10) 
and tariffs thereunder (Exhibit 4) took effect and re-
mained in effect until set aside by the court's order. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
~1 
In addition to the provisions of Section 15 ahove 
referred to, which provides that the Commission's order 
under s()etion 13 shall take effect and continue in force 
until modified or suspended by the Commission itself or 
by a court of competent jurisdiction, Section 16 of the 
Act is headed ''Orders of Commission and Enforcement 
Thereof." It refers to what should be done "after hear-
ing on a complaint made as provided in Section 13 of 
this part'' and provides : 
"Section 16 (7). It shall be the duty of every 
common carrier, its agents and employes, to ob-
serve and comply with such orders so long as the 
same shall remain in effect.'' 
Subparagraph 8 of the same section then goes on 
to provide a penalty of $5,000 for each offense, stating 
that each day shall be deemed a separate offense, and then 
follow provisions providing for the enforcement of pen-
alty provisions by the Attorney General of the United 
States and various United States District attorneys. 
It will thus be seen that a provision has been made 
in the statute itself for the eventuality of the setting aside 
of these I.C.C. orders but it requires that they shall re-
main in effect until so set aside, and carriers and others 
are compelled to comply strictly therewith so long as they 
are so in force or be subject to extreme penalties. As so 
stated by Justice Cardoza in Atlantic Coast Line v. Flor-
ida, 295 U.S. 301, 79 L.Ed. 14:51, 55 S. Ct. 713: 
"The carrier was not at liberty to take the 
la'v into its own hands and refuse submission to 
the order " .. ithout the sanction of the court. It 
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\vould have exposed itself to suits and penalties, 
both criminal and civil, if it had followed such 
path. See e.g. Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C., 
sec. 16 (8), (9), (10), (11). Obedience was owing 
while the order was in force.'' 
On page 13 of appellant's brief counsel refers to the 
case of North Carolina v. United States, 325 U.S. 507, 
89 L.Ed. 1760, 65 S. Ct. 1260, and. again confuses the 
terms ''jurisdiction'' and ''justification'' and italicizes 
a quotation in that case from Florida v. United States, 
282 U.S. 194, wherein Chief Justice Hughes says that 
before the I.C.C. can nullify a state rate, justification 
for the ''exercise of federal power must clearly appear.'' 
It will be noted that Chief Justice Hughes did not say 
''jurisdiction'' must be shown but said that ''justification 
for the exercise" of power or jurisdiction must appear. 
There is a distinction between jurisdiction to act and 
justifica.tion for the exercise of that jurisdiction and that is 
what makes a difference between orders or judgments 
which will be "void" for want of jurisdiction, or "void-
able'' because of error in the exercise of that jurisdiction. 
Both the North Carolina case and the recent opinion 
of the United States Supreme Court in 356 U.S. 421 refer 
to the fact that the evidence must meet a ''high standard 
of certainty.'' If there is no ''jurisdiction,'' then the 
question of evidence becomes immaterial. If there is jur-
isdiction, then we would ask: When, during the course of 
presentation of evidence, \Yould a court or commission 
lose jurisdiction because the evidence does not meet the 
high standard of certainty 1 If the evidence is insufficient 
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after it is all in, then the court or commission errs in 
issuing a judgment or order. But such is error making 
the judgment or order voidable and giving a basis for 
setting it aside on appeal and does not make the entire 
proceedings void. 
In the very case last referred to and quoted from, 
Chief Justice Hughes said (282 U.S. at page 211): 
''The question in the present cases then is not 
one of authority but of its appropriate exer-
cise. * • •" 
In reversing the lower court and setting the I.C.C. 
order aside, the United States Supreme Court in Public 
Service Com. of Utah v. United States, 356 U.S. 421, 2 
L.Ed. 2d 886, 78 S. Ct. 796, concluded as follows (page 
429): 
''The judgment of the District Court is re-
versed and the cause is remanded to that court 
with instructions to set aside the order of the Com-
mission and remand the cause to the Commission 
for further proceedings in conformity with this 
opinion.'' 
Counsel for appellants argue that in view of that 
court's decision the ''jurisdiction'' of the I. C. C. failed 
and it had no further power to do anything. In other 
words, it is counsel's position, and he has at all prior 
stages in this proceeding argued, that the I.C.C. had no 
power to do anything save to dismiss the proceeding. 
Why then, we will ask, would the Supreme Court direct 
that the matter be remanded to the I.C.C. ''for further 
proceedings in conformity with this opinion"~ The Su-
preme Court was not directing a useless thing, but it was 
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sending the matter back to the I.C.C. in the self-same pro .. 
ceeding in which the I.C.C. had originally acted, to give 
the I.C.C. an opportunity to correct any errors and give 
proper validity to the order which the Court had thus set 
aside because of errors in the proceedings. 
In Erie R. Co. v. United States, 64 F. Supp. 162, a 
three-judge federal court had before it an order of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission with respect to rates, 
and in that case the argument was advanced as by plain-
tiff's counsel here, that the original order was void and 
on remand the I.C.C. had no authority but to dismiss. In 
that case reference was made to Section 15 (2) of the 
Interstate Commerce Act, providing that such order 
should take effect and remain in effect ''unless the same 
shall be suspended or set aside by a court of competent 
jurisdiction.'' On the point of authority of the Commis-
sion to further proceed, it was argued, ''Since this court 
set aside the Commission's order the plaintiffs contend 
that the Commission had no authority to proceed in the 
case.'' 
To this argument the three-judge federal court 
answered: 
''We think this contention .has no merit. The 
statute specifically provides that the Commission 
is authorized to 'suspend or modify its orders upon 
such notice and in such manner as it shall deem 
proper.' Section 16 (6). This provision invests 
the Commission with a con-tinuing jurisdiction, and 
the provision in Section 15 (2) above quoted does 
not create nor contenzplate amy linz itation upon 
the cont·inuing jurisdiction. It provides that after 
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an order of the Commission is suspended or set 
aside by a court, it is no longer effectiYe. But 
neither expressly nor by necessary implication 
does it provide that after the court has set aside 
one of its orders the Commission can take no fur-
ther action with reference to the subject matter of 
the order. In this case the construction contended 
for would result in the absurd conclusion that when 
a court has determined that the Commission erred 
in issuing an order not based on evidence 1 the 
Commission is not empowered to acquiesce in the 
court's ruling and to re-open the case for the tak-
ing of evidence. Such a result is neither required 
nor authorized by the statute. 
''We are strengthened in this conclusion by the 
fact that the Supreme Court has sustained the ac-
tion of the Commission in instances where an order 
has been set aside because of inadequate findings 
and thereafter the Commission has heard addi-
tional evidence and made additional findings. 
(Cases Cited) 
''We conclude that the Commission was clearly 
authorized to proceed with the rehearing in this 
case.'' 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina recently had 
occasion to reverse an order of its State Commission 
with respect to increases in freight rates similar to the 
matter involved here. The matter was sent back for fur-
ther proceedings to the State Commission, and after fur-
ther hearing the Commission issued the same order as 
issued before, which was then approved by the Supreme 
Court. It was argued that the new order involved retro-
active rate making, which the Commission could not do. 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina did not agree 'vith 
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such contention and characterized its pnor decision 
remanding the case, saying such opinion ''as interpreted 
by this court had the effect of remanding this cause to the 
Commission for further hearings; this being a continua-
tion of the same cause, the principle of res judicata and 
the rule of law which forbids retroactive rate making are 
not applicable to the order of the Commission under 
review by this court.'' See State of North Carolina v. De-
partment of Agriculture, 109 S.E. 2d 368 at 374. (June 12, 
1959) 
We confidently assert that counsel for appellant is 
urging an erroneous position when he argues that the 
action of the Supreme Court in setting aside the I.C.C. 
orders was equivalent to a decision that such order was 
void. Not only is counsel in error in so assuming, but 
he makes no attempt to cite authorities to sustain such a 
proposition. We have already pointed out that the fact 
that the Supreme Court remanded the matter for further 
proceedings indicates that they did not hold the order 
void but sent it back to allow the I. C. C. to correct the evi-
dentiary deficiencies if possible. 
The Supreme Court of the United States has itself 
on more than one occasion held that remand of a case 
as was done in this instance does not terminate the right 
of the inferior tribunal to proceed further and does not 
make either the prior or subsequent proceedings void. 
The I.C.C. itself on pages 4 and 5 of its last report (Ex-
hibit 11) so answers counsel on the same argument made 
by him before that body. 
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In the case of Serurities & Exchange Conunissiou v. 
Chenery Gorp., 322 U.S. 194, 91 L.Ed. 1955, 67 S. Ct. 157r>, 
the United States Supreme Court, referring to such a 
remand, stated at page 250: 
''This obviously meant something more than 
the entry of a perfunctory order.'' 
Also, in the case of Ford Motor Co. v. Labor Board, 
305 U.S. 364, 83 L.Ed. 221, 59 S. Ct. 301, the Supreme 
Court stated at page 37 4 : 
''Such a remand does not dismiss or terminate 
the administrative proceeding. If findings are lack-
ing which may properly be made on the evidence 
already received, the court does not require the 
evidence to be reheard. • • • If further evidence 
is necessary and available to supply the bases for 
findings on material points, that evidence may be 
taken. • • •. '' 
As is stated by appellants on page 16 of their brief, 
the railroads do place considerable reliance upon the 
case of Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Florida, 295 U.S. 
301, 79 L.Ed. 1451, 55 S. Ct. 713. Counsel then says that 
such case is ''basically entirely different.'' The only 
"basic" difference which counsel even attempts to point 
out is the question as to whether jurisdiction to hear the 
present controversy should be in the state court or the 
federal court. It is not a question of "jurisdiction" of 
the I. C. C., and the question of "jurisdiction" to hear the 
matter no"'" before this court is outside the issues of this 
case. As far as this court is concerned, it has jurisdic-
tion to hear the matter presently before it. In the Florida 
case the matter of restitution was heard before the federal 
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court, where there was ''conceded jurisdiction.'' No ques-
tion at all was raised there as to whether the matter 
should be heard in the federal or in the state court, but 
that in no manner distinguishes or makes "basically dif-
ferent'' the right or absence of a right on the part of the 
plaintiffs to have restitution in this case. In fact, in the 
Structural Steel case to which counsel for appellants likes 
to refer, the Circuit Court stated that even if it should 
be finally determined that the rates in question were 
"unsupported by any valid order," that in such event 
''the right to prevail would depend upon traditional no-
tions of equity as in Atlantic Coast Lines v. Florida, 295 
u.s. 301." 
The report of litigation involved in the Atlantic Coast 
LineR. Co. v. Florida cases is much too long to make more 
than very brief reference to here, but we do commend 
the court to a study of the various proceedings involved 
in that case, a study and analysis of which will show a 
complete parallel with the situation now involved before 
this court. That case went to the United States Supreme 
Court three times. In the first hearing the I.C.C. con-
cluded that intrastate rates discriminated against inter-
state commerce and ordered intrastate rates increased. 
A three-judge federal court sustained the order, but, on 
appeal, the United States Supreme Court held the find-
ings insufficient to support the Commission's order and 
set the order aside. Florida v. United States, 282 U.S. 
194, 75 L.Ed. 291, 51 S. Ct. 119. On remand the I.C.C. 
re-opened the proceedings and, after full hearing, issued 
another order, again requiring said intrastate rates to 
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be increased. A three-judge court aga1n sustained the 
order, and, on a second appeal, the United States Supreme 
Court sustained such second order. Florida v. [/nifed 
A~1 fates, ~9~ U.S. 1., 78 L.Ed. 1077, 54 S. Ct. 603. Chief 
Justice Hughes was the 'vriter of the opinion in each of 
these two appeals. 
During a period of two years after the original I. C. C. 
order and before its reversal by the Supreme Court on 
the first appeal, the railroads had collected the increased 
rates. After the reversal the shippers who had intervened 
in the federal district court proceedings petitioned that 
court for a decree requiring the railroads to repay the 
increases so paid. The matter was referred to a master, 
who recommended restitution of only part of the in-
creases, on the basis that the original state rates had been 
too low. The three-judge court affirmed his report and 
recommendation and both parties appealed. 
The Supreme Court sustained the last order of the 
Commission, reversed the holding of the court and the 
master with respect to repayment of part of the increases 
collected, held tha_t the orders of the Commission were not 
void and that the shippers were not entitled to restitution 
of any of the amounts so paid. The court, speaking 
through Justice Cardoza, said (_.A.tlantic Coast Line v. 
Florida, 295 U.S. 301 at 310, 79 L.Ed. 1451, 55 S. Ct. 713) : 
'' * • • 'Restitution is not of mere right. It is 
ex gratia, resting in the exercise of a sound dis-
cretion, and the court will not order it where the 
justice of the case does not call for it, nor where 
. t "d f 1· ' * * * 'I the process IS se as1 e or a mere s 1p. n 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
30 
such cases the simple but comprehensive question 
is whether the circumstances are such that equi-
tably the defendant should restore to the plaintiff 
what he has received' * * *" 
'' * * *. An order declaring the discrimination 
to be excessive and unjust was made by the Com-
mission before the carrier attempted to collect 
the higher charges. Thereafter the order was ad-
judged void by a decision of this court • • * but 
void solely upon the ground that the facts sup-
porting the conclusion were not embodied in the 
findings. Void in such a context is the equivalent 
of voidable. * • * The carrier was not at liberty 
to take the law into its own hands and refuse sub-
mission to the order without the sanction of a 
court. It would have exposed itself to suits and 
penalties, both criminal and civil, if it had followed 
such a path. See e.g., Interstate Commerce Act, 49 
U.S.C. sec. 16 (8) (9) (10) (11). Obedience was 
owing while the order was in force. 
''By the time that the claim for restitution had 
been heard by the master and passed upon by the 
reviewing court, the Commission had cured the 
defects in the form of its earlier decision. During 
the years affected by the claim there existed in 
very truth the unjust discrimination against inter-
state commerce that the earlier decision had at-
tempted to correct. If the processes of the law 
had been instantaneous or adequate, the attempt 
at correction would not have missed the mark. It 
was foiled through imperfections of form, through 
slips of procedure * * *, as the sequel of events 
has shown them to be. Unjust discrimination 
against interstate commerce, 'forbidden' by the 
statute, and there 'declared to be unlawful.' * * • 
does not lose its unjust quality because the evil is 
without a remedy until the Commission shall have 
spoken. The word ""'hen it goes forth inYested with 
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the forms of law may fix the consequences to be 
attributed to the conduct of the carrier in reliance 
upon an earlier word, defectiYcly pronounced, but 
aimed at the self-same evil, there from the begin-
ning. rrhe Commission was without power to give 
reparation for the injustice of the past, but it was 
not \\·ithout power to inquire whether injustice had 
been done and to make report accordingly. Indeed, 
without such an inquiry and appropriate evidence 
and findings, its order could not stand, though di-
rected to the years to come. Obedient to this duty, 
the Commission looked into the past and ascer-
tained the facts. In particular it looked into the 
very years covered by the claims for restitution 
and found the inequality and injustice inherent in 
the Cummer rates during the years they were in 
suspense and during those they were in force. 
• * •. What it had stated in its first report • • • 
was thus supplemented and confirmed by what it 
stated in the second. The two sets of findings tell 
us, when read together, that restitution is with-
out support in equity and conscience, whatever 
support may come to it from procedural entangle-
ments." 
We confidently urge upon the court that this Florida 
case, on its facts, is a close parallel to the case at bar and 
ample precedent and authority to guide the court herein. 
If more were needed, 'Ye could cite a number of cases 
"?herein the Florida case has been followed on the point 
of restitution, " .. herein the courts have held that it is 
allowable only upon an equitable basis. 
Counsel for appellants, at page 17 of his brief, tries 
to distinguish this Atlanfi.c Coast Line case by saying: 
''There was no holding of any lack of evidence to give 
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rise to the federal jurisdiction'' and again, page 20, where 
he says the defect in that case was in the findings and 
"not in the evidence." Lack of evidence or lack of find-
ings would, either one, affect only the merits and not 
jurisdiction or power to act. However, counsel does not 
read the Atla;ntic Coast Line case closely enough. On the 
first appeal the court, through Chief Justice Hughes, said 
( 282, at page 215) : 
'' * * * The Commission is the fact finding 
body and the court examines the evidence not to 
make findings for the Commission but to ascer-
tain whether its findings are properly sup-
ported. * * *.'' 
If there are not adequate findings, the court does not 
go further to examine the evidence. As was said by Jus-
tice Cardoza in 295 U.S. at 306, further quoting from the 
prior opinion by Chief Justice Hughes: 
''In the absence of such findings we are not 
called upon to examine the evidence in order to 
resolve opposing conditions as to what it 
shows. * * *. ' ' 
Regardless of what the evidence may have been on 
the first hearing, on the final appeal Justice Cardoza 
states (295 U.S. at 307) : 
'' * * * After the mandate of reversal the In-
terstate Commerce Commission listened to new 
evidence, made a new set of findings and pre-
scribed the same rate that it had put into effect 
before * * * and * * * both the findings of the 
Commission and the evidence back of the findings 
were now held to be sufficient.'' 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
33 
(~ounsel on page 19 of appellant's brief, referring to 
the ~ceond report and order of the I.C.(1• in the rase at bar 
(Exhibits 11 and 12) said:'' They do not make any attempt 
to make either their order or their findings retroactive.'' 
N Pither did the Commission in the Florida case, but in 
both eases the second report and order referred to periods 
of time covered by the first order. 
A case involving another federal agency but "'"hich 
followed interstate commerce law and procedure, is 
]forgan v. Un.ited States, which case the United States 
Supreme Court had occasion to have before it four times, 
the first time at 298 U.S. 468, 80 L.Ed. 1288, 56 S. Ct. 906. 
The la\v prescribing powers of the Secretary of Agri-
culture in setting rates to be charged by market agencies 
\\'"as similar to provisions of the Interstate Commerce 
.. \rt. The law provided that on complaint or request the 
Secretary of Agriculture should investigate the rates 
charged, and if, after a full hearing, he found questioned 
rates to be unreasonable or discriminatory, he should pre-
scribe reasonable rates thereafter to be charged. Under 
this law the Secretary of Agriculture did undertake 
an investigation into the reasonableness of existing rates 
and issued an order prescribing maximum rates there-
after to be charged, which maximum rates \vere lower 
than existing rates. 
The la\v governing procedural matters provided that 
in proceedings undertaken by the Secretary of Agricul-
ture and with respect to orders issued by him, the pro-
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visions of all laws relating to "enforcing," "suspend-
ing," or "setting aside" orders of the I. C. C. would be 
applicable. It was under such laws that the order was 
attacked before a three-judge federal court. The three-
judge court issued its decree sustaining the Secretary's 
order, but on appeal the United States Supreme Court 
reversed. In the original complaint before the three-judge 
court it was alleged that no proper or full hearing had 
been held, but the court, on motion of the government 
attorneys, struck out such allegations and the government 
was not required to answer them, and the district court 
took no evidence on the question as to whether or not a 
full hearing had been accorded. On this basis the Su-
preme Court reversed, saying the district court erred in 
striking the allegations re lack of a full hearing; - that 
on that point the government should be required to answer 
and the court take evidence - and the Supreme Court 
said: 
''The decree is reversed and the cause is re-
manded for further proceedings in conformity 
with this opinion. ' ' 
On rehearing the three-judge court took evidence with 
respect to the manner in which the Secretary had con-
ducted the investigation and the type of hearing that had 
been held and again sustained the Secretary's order. 
On a second appeal, 1V.l organ v. U11ited States, 304 U.S. 1, 
82 L.Ed. 1129, 58 S. Ct. 773, the Supreme Court discussed 
the requisites for a full hearing and concluded that a full 
hearing had not been given before the Secretary. It again 
reversed the district court and remanded the matter "for 
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further proceedings 1n conformity with our opinion.'' 
(304 u.s. 26) 
As was later referred to by the Supreme Court, the 
order of the Secretary at this time was set aside without 
consideration on the merits but solely for failure of the 
Secretary to follow the procedure prescribed by the stat-
ute. (See 307 U.S. 185.) 
In the meantime, while the matters were pending 
before the Supreme Court and before the matter got back 
to the Secretary for further hearing, monies representing 
charges in excess of the rates prescribed by the Secre-
tary's order were being impounded with the district 
court. 
On remand after the second appeal the Secretary of 
Agriculture re-opened the original proceedings for fur-
ther hearings. He served his findings in the investiga-
tion upon the market agencies and gave them a time limit 
in which to file exceptions and have oral arguments on 
such exceptions to his findings. The market agencies de-
clined to join further in the original proceedings as re-
opened and made a motion before the three-judge court to 
distribute the impounded monies among them. The Sec-
retary and government attorneys moved for a stay to 
await the outcome of further proceedings before the Sec-
retary. The three-judge court denied the stay and there-
upon entered a decree setting aside the Scretary's order, 
permanently enjoined its enforcement and directed that 
the impounded monies be distributed among the market 
agencies. From such decrees of the three-judge court the 
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government and the Secretary brought the third appeal 
to the Supreme Court. See United States v. Morgan, 
307 U.S. 183, 83 L.Ed. 1211, 59 S. Ct. 795. The original 
order of the Secretary was dated June 14, 1933, and this 
third appeal got to the Supreme Court in October, 1938. 
The basis of the district court's order distributing 
the impounded funds was that the Secretary of Agricul-
ture could not now by further order prescribe rates and 
make them effective as of June, 1933, the date of his origi-
nal order and the start of the impounding of the monies. 
This issue brought the question of the merits of the Sec-
retary's decision before the Supreme Court for the first 
time. 
This time the Supreme Court sustained the Secre-
tary's order. The court referred to the fact that the 
law required that all such rates be "just, reasonable and 
nondiscriminatory," and that even if it be conceded that 
the Secretary might not now make a retroactive rate 
order, "* * * he was free to make an order fixing rates 
for the future and for that purpose or any other within 
the purview of the Act he is now free to determine a 
reasonable rate for the period antedating any order he 
may now make." (Page 192) (Citing _A_tlantic Coast Line 
R. Co. v. Florida, 295 U.S. 301, 312) 
The court at page 195 referred to Atlantic Coast Line 
R. Co. v. Florida, saying," This court" in that case "'vent 
1nuch further'' and then added re the Florida case : 
"The final result of the litigation 'vas that the 
railroads 'vere permitted to collect and retain the 
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no la,vful order of the Commission superseding 
the state C'ommission rates. * * * But t h r re as 
here the lirst administratiue order u:as not a 
unllity. * o)!: * Though voidable it could not be ig-
nored \vithout incurring the penalties for disobe-
dience inflicted by the applicable provisions of the 
statute. The rates did not lose their unjust and 
unreasonable quality in the one case, or cease to be 
unjustly discriminatory in the other, merely be-
cause the administrative orders in each \vere void-
able for procedural defects or because a second 
order could operate only for the future. * * * '' 
The Court reversed the district court for the third 
time and ordered the impounded funds held until the Sec-
retary had completed his further proceedings. 
The Secretary proceeded with further hearing and 
used his earlier findings ''as a working basis'' for a fur-
ther hearing. But he took new evidence and gave the 
market agencies the opportunity of offering any evidence 
they desired. After his final order the three-judge court, 
by a two to one decision, set the order aside and again 
directed the monies impounded to be returned to the mar-
ket agencies. On a fourth and final appeal, the United 
States Supreme Court again reversed and upheld the Sec-
retary's order as it affected the rate from June, 1933, 
for"'"ard and refused to order the moneys to be refunded. 
See [Tn.ited States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 85 L.Ed. 1429, 
61 S. Ct. 999. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
38 
POINT TWO 
THE TARIFFS CHARGED AND COL-
LECTED BY THE DEFENDANT RAIL-
ROADS DURING THE PERIOD IN QUES-
TION WERE EFFECTIVELY "FILED" 
AND WERE THE TARIFFS ''ON FILE AND 
IN EFFECT'' AND HAD TO BE COMPLIED 
WITH UNDER BOTH FEDERAL AND 
UTAH STATE LAW. 
Under his Point Four, counsel for appellant argues 
that the "mailing" of the tariffs to the P.S.C.U. was not 
a ''filing'' of the tariffs. We will ask, how are tariffs nor-
mally filed and what was done and not done in filing the 
tariffs in question which should have been done~ 
Plaintiffs produced as their witness Keith E. Sohm, 
Commerce Attorney and head of the Rate and Tariff De-
partment of the P.S.C.U. (R. 54) He identified the mas-
ter tariffs of increased rates under Ex Parte 175, (R. 57) 
and the several tariffs produced by him included a num-
ber of supplements which had been filed. Included in these 
supplements was a sheet designated as "K-19" (Page 14 
of Exhibit 4), concerning which he said (R. 58): "The 
particular supplement which was filed to make effective 
in Utah certain rates is called K-19, I believe.'' Even 
plaintiff's counsel's question asked: ''These are the cop-
ies of the tariffs filed pursuant to the Interstate Com-
merce Commission order 'vi th your Commission~'' 
( R. 38) To which Mr. S.ohm answered, ''Correct.'' 
(R. 59) The original Ex Parte 175 tariffs were not in-
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tended to become effective on Utah intrastate traffic until 
a subsequent supplement was published. ''That subse-
quent supplement is called K-19. It was stamped received 
on June 21, 1956. It \vas stamped filed on June 21, 1956. 
It ~tates an effective date of June 22, 1956." (R. 59) 
With respect to ''mailing" or "filing" no distinction 
is made by the P.S.C.U. between tariffs filed for "infor-
mation'' and ''effective tariffs.'' These tariffs - in-
cluding the supplement l(-19- were ''made a part of our 
regular file and all of the tariffs were put together. There 
\vas no distinction in the handling of this tariff and 
other regular tariffs.'' ( R. 65) 
With respect to supplement K-19 Mr. Sohm said: 
"As far as I know it was filed with our commission and 
the increases were charged.'' ( R. 66) 
Appellant's counsel tries to make a point of the fact 
that the P .S.C. U. issued no orders approving such tariffs, 
but l\[r. Sohm said he knew of no instance when the 
P.S.C.U. had ever issued any order approving tariffs 
\vhich had been filed pursuant to I.C.C. order. (R. 66) 
The l{-19 supplement was similar to numerous tariffs 
and supplements filed with the P.S.C.U. almost daily'' and 
by such filing become effective to control the transporta-
tion of Utah intrastate traffic if they affect you in intra-
state traffic as K-19 did?" Answer: "Yes." (R. 68) ~Ir. 
Sohm further testified that the railroads ''published a 
successive supplement which * • • cancels supplement 
l(-19." (R. 6) Tariff "Supplement K-36" (Sheet 2 of 
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Exhibit 4) ''is the supplement which took the effective-
ness of the Ex Parte 175 increases out of effect." (R. 74) 
Mr. Sohm also testified (R. 79): "Were these rates 
that were made effective under the supplement K-19 such 
that the railroads could not have lowered or charged less 
on any freight affected by that without authority either 
from the Public Service Commission or the Interstate 
Commerce Commission 1'' Answer : ''I believe that is 
true. * * *." 
We would here pose the question: Suppose the 
I.C.C. order had not been set aside, what then would have 
been the result of this filing 1 There would then have 
been no possible question as to the propriety and effec-
tiveness of the filing of such rates and no further filing 
would have been necessary. The controlling issue, then, is 
what was the effect of the Supreme Court's decision set-
ting the I. C. C. order aside 1 Did it make such order and 
everything done under it void ad initio or only voidable, 
so that it should be set aside as was done by the Supreme 
Court and sent back for further proceedings' This action 
of the Supreme Court was like a reversal for insufficient 
evidence in a court of law where a matter is sent back for 
a new trial, and on the ne'v trial, if proper evidence is 
produced, the original judgment or a subsequent one 
identical in terms may be supported and affirmed. 
Respondents respectfully urge that under the circum-
stances here shown the increased tariffs were the ''tariffs 
on file and in effect at the time" and had to be complied 
with under both state and federal law. 
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lTtah Code Annotated, :l4-3-2 (1). "Every common 
carrier shall file with the Co1nmission * * * schedules 
showing- the rate~, fares and charges * * * for transpor-
tation. * * *" 
U.C.A. 54-3-6 (1) provides that no common carrier 
shall engage in transportation within the state until its 
schedules shall have been filed and published, and then 
provides in subparagraph (2): 
''No common carrier shall charge * * * a 
greater or less or different compensation for * * * 
transportation * * * than the rates and fares * * * 
as specified in its schedules filed and in effect at 
the time; nor shall any carrier refund or limit* * * 
any portion of the rates, fares or charges so speci-
fied except upon order of the Commission as here-
inafter provided. * * * '' 
U. C. A. 54-3-7: 
''No public utility shall charge, demand, collect 
or receive a greater or less or different compen-
sation * * * than the rates * * * and charges a pplic-
able to such * * * service as specified in its 
schedules on file and in effect at the time." 
U. C. A. 54-3-11 prohibits rebates and says carriers 
must not allo'\v any transportation ''at less than the rates 
and fares then established and in force as shotcn by the 
schedules filed and in effect at the time." 
From these statutes it is clear that filed tariffs have 
the force of la'\v and must be complied \vith until or unless 
suspended or changed. See Keogh v. C. & N. TV. R. Co., 
260 U.S. 156, 67 L.Ed. 183, 43 S. Ct. 47. 
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We are mindful of U.C.A. 54-7-12, referred to by 
appellant's counsel, which provides that no utility may 
raise any rate except upon a showing before and finding 
by the Commission. That provision is contained in sub-
paragraph (1). But what if such rates are :filed~ What is 
the purpose of subparagraph (2) of U.C.A. 54-7-12, which 
says that whenever any tariff is filed ''increasing or re-
sulting in any increase in any rate" the Commission may 
''enter upon a hearing concerning the propriety of such 
rate''~ During the period of investigation the Commis-
sion may suspend the effectiveness of such rate up to six 
months. The statute does not say such filed rate making 
an increase is or should be considered a nullity. This 
very definitely shows the legislative intent that the pub-
lishing and filing of a rate was intended to make such 
rate effective and applicable. If done by order of the 
Commission after a hearing, clearly the Commission 
would have no basis for suspending and entering upon a 
hearing concerning its propriety. It has been held that 
rates which have been published and filed containing a 
mistake nevertheless are considered binding and an in-
creased rate so contained in a filed tariff by mistake must 
be paid and then application can be made for reparations 
with respect to it. See Louisville Ceme,nt Co. v. Interstate 
Commerce Commission, 246 U.S. 638, 62 L.Ed. 914, 38 
S. Ct. 408. 
The scheme of the entire Utah Public Utilities Act, 
\vhich is very comprehensive, contemplates that rates may 
be set by Commission order or may be set by a Yoluntary 
filing by a carrier, in \Yhich latter event the Commis-
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sion may suspPnd and hold an investigative hearing. But 
a filed rate is considered to have the force of law until 
suspended, cancelled or set aside, and extreme penalties 
are provided by both state and federal law for disregard-
ing such filed tariffs. See statement by Justice Cardoza 
in Atlantic Coast Line v. Florida, 295 U.S. at 311. 
POINT THREE 
THE FURTHER FINDINGS AND REPORT 
OF THE I.C.C. OF DECEMBER, 1959 SUP-
PLEMENT AND SUPPORT THE ORIGINAL 
FINDINGS ON WHICH THE OI~DER OF 
FEBRUARY 8, 1956, WAS BASED AND DE-
TAIL EVIDENCE WHICH THE SUPRE:\lE 
COURT SAID WAS LACKING. 
Counsel for appellants, in arguing under his Point 
Five, at page 26, again tries to distinguish the Atlantic 
Coast Line case by saying that in that case the I.C.C. 
"merely corrected the defective findings in the original 
order." Justice Cardoza in that case makes two refer-
ences to this point. At the beginning of his opinion he 
said that the I.C.C., ''upon new evidence and new findings, 
made the same order it had made before." (295 U.S. 305) 
Again, at page 307, he says, ''After the mandate of re-
Yersal the Interstate Commerce Commission listened to 
new evidence, made a new set of findings and prescribed 
the same rate that it had put into effect before." We ask, 
ho'v can counsel, or anyone else, distinguish that from 
the case at bar 1 
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On page 26 appellant's brief also intimates that the 
I.C.C. in the second report and order (Exhibits 11 and 12) 
does not purport to cover any of the conditions existing 
prior to its first order, and he refers to findings on pages 
25 to 29 of Exhibit 11, saying,'' They make no reference to 
conditions existing prior to December 7, 1959. '' Why 
should counsel limit reference to pages 25 to 29 ~ The first 
25 pages of the report (Exhibit 11) were intended by the 
Commission to have some effect in detailing the evidence 
which they considered and what it showed. The I.C.C. 
again did just as Justice Cardoza in the Atlantic Coast 
Line v. Florida case, 295 U. S. at 312, said that the I.C.C. 
did in that case : '' * * * in particular it looked into the 
very years covered by the claims for restitution and 
found the inequality inherent in the Cummer rates during 
the years they were in suspense and during those they 
were in force. * * * What it had stated in its first report 
* * * was thus supplemented and confirmed by "~hat is 
stated in the second. * * *. '' In the case at bar (Exhibit 
11, page 5) the I. C. C. states: "The evidence on further 
hearing, for the most part covers the entire period within 
which the Ex Parte Nos. 175, 196 and 206 increases be-
came applicable on intrastate rates. To avoid duplica-
tion of discussion as much as possible, the evidence gen-
erally will be considered as a whole. * * * Data for 1954 
will indicate the situation 'vith respect to the increase in 
Ex Parte 175 and (data for) 1956 and 1957 with respect to 
Ex Parte 196 and 206 increases. ' ' 
For the next several pages the Commission then goes 
on to detail evidence coYering the entire period, both 
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hPfore the ordvr of February, 1956 as well as subsequent 
thereto, and this continues from pages 6 to 1;j, inclusive. 
In some places comparisons are made with averages of 
1~);{;> to 1939, and in some places with averages of 1947 
to 1~)-l-9. On page 7 the increases in railroad material 
costs and \vages from 1939 up to 1954 were shown, coY-
Pring the period prior to the first order; also, material 
costs and wage increases as further increased by 1956. 
1\t the same time, comparative increases in freight rates 
up to 1954, and again also to 1956, were shown~ also, 
farmers' prices, wholesale prices, consumers' prices and 
per capita income payments as they had increased over 
previous base period up to 1954, which would cover a 
period included in the first order, and also further in-
ereases up to 1956 which would be involved in Ex Parte 
196 and 206. At pages 10 to 12 it referred to main line 
and branch line grades and curvatures, showing steeper 
grades and excess curvatures on branch lines; also, wages 
and overtime, showing higher wages and more O\?ertime 
paid on branch lines, where the majority of the intrastate 
traffic moved. These all affected the period prior to the 
order of 1956 as well as giving figures for the additional 
years of 1956 and 1957. 
The United States Supreme Court, in reversing the 
prior order, mentioned and placed considerable reliance 
upon density figures and operating ratios, referring to 
eYidence \vhich had been introduced by plaintiffs as 
protestants in that prior case (356 U.S. at 426). 
In the prior hearing evidence as to density and ratios 
had been introduced in an exhibit prepared by the Public 
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Service Commission of Utah, attempting to sho"\Y a com-
parison between density of intrastate traffic and densi1 y 
of interstate traffic on the theory that where the greatPr 
amount of traffic moves, the overall costs are spread 
thinner. Admittedly, the figures introduced at that time 
included some interstate traffic, and the railroads did not 
introduce actual figures showing only intrastate density. 
On the rehearing the railroads did introduce actual den-
sity figures and very definitely proved - in fact, the 
P.S.C.U. Auditor admitted- that the "intrastate'' den-
sity figures which they had used included not only intra-
state traffic, which would be traffic moving wholly within 
Utah, but also included all traffic originating in Utah and 
moving out, all traffic originating outside and moving into 
Utah, and all traffic neither originating nor terminating 
in Utah, but which moved across Utah and which is 
termed "bridge" or "overhead" traffic. For their inter-
state figures they used railroad system statistics outside 
of Utah. Upon the further hearing after remand from 
the federal court, to counteract this, the railroads intro-
duced actual figures showing what was purely Utah intra-
state traffic and what was actually interstate traffic 
already bearing higher rates. The very years - 1953 and 
1954- which were included in the P.S.C.U. exhibit in the 
prior hearing, showing the evidence upon which the 
United States Supreme Court relied, were again covered; 
and the actual figures show interstate traffic density to 
be at least three times that of intrastate traffic density. 
Similar actual density figures 'vere also sho,vn for the 
years 1956 and 1957. The I.C.C. referred in detail to 
these figures on pages 13 and 14 of the Exhibit 11 and 
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<'Oll<'lnded that all of such figures, both with respect to the 
yPars prior as well as after the order of February, 1956, 
show" thP more favorable density of the interstate traffic 
compared with the intrastate traffic." The I. C. C. also, at 
thP bottom of page 14 of Exhibit 11, refers to the density 
figures as produced by the protestants (plaintiffs) and 
definitely state that the value of such evidence \\~as "im-
paired'' because it included "heavy overhead movement,'' 
\\~hich \vas all interstate and not proper in intrastate fig-
ures at all. It will thus be seen that not only did the 
I. C. C. ''make reference to conditions existing prior to 
December 7, 1959," but referred to the very evidence that 
applied to the points which the Supreme Court said \vas 
lacking in its prior order, to show the facts which existed 
at the time of and previous to that prior order, as well as 
to show that such facts continued to exist as of the date of 
its last order (Exhibit 11). Here again we say that this 
shows a parallel to the Atlantic Coast Line case and the 
decision of the court in that case should be controlling 
here because, as in that case so also in this, the I.C.C. 
''looked into the very years covered by the claims for res-
titution and found the inequality and injustice'' still to 
exist and "what it had stated in its first report * * * 
\vas thus supplemented and confirmed by \vhat it stated 
in the second.'' 
POINT FOUR 
~\PPLIC.A_TION TO THE PUBLIC SERV-
ICE COMMISSION OF UTAH FOR REP A-
RATIONS IS A PREREQUISITE TO ANY 
RIGHT OF REP~\R~\TION OR RESTITU-
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TION, REGARDLESS OF THE EFFECT OF 
ANY I.C.C. ORDER. 
Counsel for appellant in his brief admits the statu-
tory provision concerning reparation but tries to argue 
against its application by saying that the permissive word 
''may'' is used, and says, ''Suppose the Commission does 
not want to take jurisdiction.'' We think that such an 
argument has no merit whatsoever. By comparison we 
refer to Utah Code Annotated, 54-4-1, which says that 
the Commission is vested with power and jurisdiction to 
supervise and regulate every public utility in the state. 
This again is a statement that the Commission has been 
granted the power to do certain things but does not di-
rectly say that they have the obligation to exercise that 
power. Would counsel, with respect to such provisions, 
say, ''Suppose the Commission does not want to regulate 
a public utility.'' Could we say that it does not have to 
under the law1 
He argues that the statute is silent on the question 
of whether or not the statutory remedy is exclusive. The 
statute is broad, and with such broad coverage provides 
numerous remedies without reserving the common law 
remedy. The concluding sentence of sec. 54-7-20 reads: 
''The remedy in this section provided shall be 
cumulative and in addition to any other remedy or 
remedies under this title in case of failure of a 
public utility to obey an order or decision of the 
Commission.'' 
The limiting of remedies to those "under this title" 
shows the intent of the framers of the statute to lodge the 
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exelusive pO\\.t'r to determine the right to reparations in 
the Commission, 'vith the right then to go to any court of 
eompetent jurisdiction to enforce the reparation order. 
\\'" e think such would be a situation where the maxim 
"·ould apply "'inc[ usia unius est e.rclusio alterius." With 
such a broad coverage in the statute, if it had been the 
intent of the legislators to preserve the common la'v 
rPmedy, we think they would have so stated; but the Utah 
i\et was passed within approximately ten years after 
issuance from the Supreme Court of its decision in the 
case of Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 
"·hich will be referred to presently and which construed 
the Interstate Commerce Act with respect to such a 
matter. 
It is admitted that in absence of a statute which may 
be controlling there was a right at common law to recover 
against a carrier who had exacted unreasonable or exorbi-
taut rates from a shipper. In order to so recover it was 
necessary for the shipper to plead and prove, and for the 
court to adjudge, that the rates which had been exacted 
'vere unreasonable. Plaintiffs never attempted such in 
the case at bar. 
With the enacting of the Interstate Commerce Act 
and the numerous public service commission acts in the 
Yarious states, it has been held generally that these acts 
supersede the right at common law as far as any common 
la"· right of recovery is concerned. There are one or two 
exceptions, but the jurisdictions so holding are in the 
minority and are based upon specific statutory provisions 
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saying that the common law remedy is retained or still 
available, or words of some similar purport. The Inter-
state Commerce Act itself provided: 
''Nothing in this Act contained shall in any way 
abridge or alter the remedies now existing at 
common law or by statute, but the provisions of 
this Act are in addition to such remedies.'' 
In spite of that provision, the Supreme Court of the 
United States, in a case now considered a landmark case 
and cited and followed extensively, Texas & Pac. Ry. v. 
Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 51 L.Ed. 553, 27 S. 
Ct. 350, held that such provision was so repugnant to the 
other provisions and purpose of the Interstate Com-
merce Act to require uniformity in rates, that it could not 
stand in the face of other provisions, and the rule estab-
lished in that case has since been followed - that the 
Interstate Commerce Act superseded and abolished all 
common law remedies with respect to reparations as far 
as interstate rates were concerned. 
In referring to the provisions and purposes of the 
Interstate Commerce Act, the Supreme Court in the 
Abilene case said at page 437: 
''The act made it the duty of carriers subject to 
its provisions to charge only just and reasonable 
rates. To that end the duty was imposed of es-
tablishing and publishing schedules of such rates. 
It forbade all unjust preferences and discrimina-
tions, made it unlawful to depart from the rates 
in the established schedules until the same were 
changed as authorized by the act, and such de-
parture was made an offense punishable by fine or 
imprisonment, or both, and the prohibitions of 
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the art and the punishments which it imposed "·ere 
directed not only against carriers but against 
shippers, or any person \vho, directly or indi-
rectly, by any machination or device in any 
manner \vhatsoever, accomplished the result of 
producing the wrongful discriminations or prefer-
ences which the act forbade. It was made the duty 
of carriers subject to the act to file with the In-
terstate Commerce Commission created by that 
act copies of established schedules, and power 
was conferred upon that body to provide as to 
the form of the schedules, and penalties were im-
posed for not establishing and filing the required 
schedules. The Commission was endowed with 
plenary administrative power to supervise the 
conduct of carriers, to investigate their affairs, 
their accounts and their methods of dealing, and 
generally to enforce the provisions of the act. 
* * * Power was conferred upon the Commis-
sion to hear complaints concerning violations of 
the act, to investigate the same, and if the com-
plaints were well founded, to direct not only the 
making of reparation to the injured persons, but 
to order the carrier to desist from such violation 
in the future. In the event of the failure of a 
carrier to obey the order of the Commission that 
body, or the party in whose favor an award of 
reparation was made, was empowered to compel 
compliance by invoking the authority of the courts 
of the United States in the manner pointed out in 
the statute, prima facie effect in such courts 
being given to the findings of fact made by the 
Commission.'' 
It is apparent that the Public Utilities Act of Utah 
"·as patterned after the Interstate Commerce Act, and 
the foregoing quote from the Abilene case could be re-
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peated verbatim as fully applicable to the Public Utilities 
Act of the State of Utah. 
A comparison of the provisions in the various sec-
tions of Title 54, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, definitely 
confirms this to be a fact. 54-3-1 says all charges shall be 
just and reasonable and every unjust or unreasonable 
charge is prohibited and declared unlawful. 54-3-2 im-
poses a duty on every carrier of filing with the P.S.C.U. 
its schedules of rates, and 54-3-6 prohibits a carrier from 
engaging in any transportation until its rates and charges 
have been filed and published. 54-3-6 (3) prohibits pref-
erences, discriminations or reduced or free transportation. 
54-3-7 makes it unlawful to depart from the rates estab-
lished in tariffs on file and in effect, and forbids refunds 
and rebates. 54-3-8 again forbids preferences. At the 
end of the title, 54-7-25 to 28 refers to violations of any 
part of Title 54 and provides numerous and severe pen-
alties, and 54-7-24 gives a right of injunction to stop 
threatened violations. 54-3-11 again forbids rebates or 
preferences which might be accomplished by any machi-
nation or falsification. In connection with the requirement 
of filing schedules of rates with the P.S.C.U., sec. 
54-3-2 (2) confers power upon the P.S.C.U. to prescribe 
"the form of the schedules." Chapter 4 of Title 54 
gives the P.S.C.U. broad and plenary po"'"ers to super-
vise all utilities, to investigate their affairs ( 54-4-2), pre-
scribe and investigate their accounts and records ( 54-4-22 
to 24) (54-7-19), regulate rules, equipment and service 
( 54-4-7) and require improvements, extensions and re-
pairs ( 54-4-8). Even track connections, spurs and switch-
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ing service (54-4-10 and 11) and regulation of safety ap-
pliances and joint use of facilities ( 34-4-13 and 14) is 
included. Power is conferred upon such commission to 
hear complaints and to make investigations either upon 
complaint of any party (54-7-9) or upon its own motion 
(;)4-4-2). Power is given to hear and determine repara-
tions (54-7-20) and to have the help of the courts, the 
Attorney General and district attorneys in enforcing its 
orders and all laws affecting public utilities (54-7-21). 
It would be hard to conceive a law giving more dis-
cretion and broader coverage than does such Utah la\v. 
The quotation at the bottom of page 31 and top of 
page 32 of appellant's brief taken from the case of South-
ern Pac. v. Superior Court, 150 Pac. 397, can be para-
phrased and is very apropos here because, as there said, 
referring to interpretation of the Interstate Commerce 
.A .. rt and similar state acts, ''It is evident that the system 
of regulation of rates and fares'' as provided by Utah 
law was ''modeled upon the federal Act for the regula-
tion of commerce between the states,'' and ''this being so 
it will be assumed that the people" of the State of Utah 
''in enacting the same or similar terms of their written 
la,v, intended to express the same meaning as that estab-
lished as the true meaning of the law from which these 
la,Ys of the state have been derived.'' 
Referring specifically to reparations and the para-
mount requirement (which exists in both the federal and 
the Utah Act) that all rates must be reasonable and uni-
form in their application, and in holding that applica-
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tion must first be made to the commission, the United 
States Supreme Court in the Abilene case said (at 
page 441): 
'' * * * This must be, because, if the power 
existed in both courts and the Commission to 
originally hear complaints on this subject, there 
might be a divergence between the action of the 
Commission and the decision of a court. In other 
words, the established schedule might be found 
reasonable by the Commission in the first instance 
and unreasonable by a court acting originally, and 
thus a conflict would arise which would render the 
enforcement of the act impossible.'' 
(Page 442): 
'' * * * This becomes particularly cogent when 
it is observed that the power of the courts to 
award damages to those claiming to have been in-
jured, as provided in the section, contemplates 
only a decree in favor of the individual complain-
ant, redressing the particular wrong asserted to 
have been done, and does not embrace the power 
to direct the carrier to abstain in the future from 
similar violations of the act ; in other words, to 
command a correction of the established schedules, 
which power, as we have shown is conferred by the 
act upon the Commission in express terms. * * * 
Although an established schedule of rates may 
have been altered by a carrier voluntarily or as the 
result of the enforcement of an order of the Com-
mission to desist from violating the la,Y, rendered 
in accordance \vith the provisions of the statute, 
it may not be doubted that the power of the Com-
mission would nevertheless extend to hearing legal 
complaints of and a\varding reparation to indiYid-
uals for wrongs unlawfully suffered from the ap-
plication of the unreasonable schedule during the 
period when such schedule was in force.'' 
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The Court further stated (at page 446) : 
'' • • • When the Commission is called upon 
on the complaint of an individual to consider the 
reasonableness of an established rate, its power is 
invoked not merely to authorize a departure from 
such rate in favor of the complaint alone, but to 
exert the authority conferred upon it by the act, if 
the complaint is found to be just, to compel the 
establishment of a new schedule of rates applicable 
to all. * * * " 
The foregoing quotations consist of only a part of 
the enlightening discussion by the Court in the Abilene 
case, but the reasons therein contained apply just as 
strongly, if not more so, to the Utah Act as to the Inter-
state Commerce Act. We commend the court to a thor-
ough study of that Abilene case. 
On page 30 of their brief appellants argue: ''In this 
case the question of whether or not the tariffs are too 
high or too low is beside the point." The question of the 
reasonableness of such rates is not beside the point but 
a necessary part of plaintiffs' case if plaintiff claims 
under a common law theory. The Supreme Court in the 
Abilene case with respect to this said: 
'' • * • Even under plaintiffs' own theory, re-
covery could not be had unless the rates as 
charged and collected were unreasonable and ex-
cessive. * * * '' 
Under the common law right of action it had to be 
alleged and proved that the rates as charged and col-
lected were unreasonable and excessive and plaintiffs 
never even attempted to so show. 
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The only case which counsel cites in an attempt to 
support appellants' claimed common law right is the case 
of Jeremy Fuel & Grain Co. v. Denver & R. G. R. Co., 60 
Utah 153, 207 Pac. 155, which he says confirms the exis-
tence of a common law right of action, and he adds that 
the annotator of the Utah Code also thought this case 
reserved common law right. Such would be true \vith 
respect to the law involved in that case, but an annota-
tor does not go further to analyze changes which may be 
made in statutes and their effect after such changes, and 
we have never understood that an annotator's opinion 
should be considered as binding precedent, otherwise 
annotator's opinions might give binding interpretative 
law upon our whole body of statutes. 
In that first Jeremy case there was no Public Serv-
ice Commission or Public Utilities Commission to apply 
to during the period there involved. The rates and 
charges there involved were paid during the period be-
tween November 20, 1914, and March 7, 1917. The Utah 
Public Utilities Act, Chapter 47, Session La\YS, 1917, be-
came effective on approval on March 8, 1917. Thus \ve 
have no need to quarrel with the statement that a common 
law right of action was available as set forth in the 
Jeremy case in 60 Utah 153, but such common la\v right 
was no longer available after that date. It "rill be noted 
that that Jeremy case \vas decided in ~lay of 1922, and the 
complaint in that case, as stated in the first paragraph of 
the opinion, was filed in ~larch, 1919, t\vo years after the 
Public Utilities Act \Yent into effect. In vie\\T of this \Ve 
want to call attention of court and counsel to the fact that 
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the .Jeremy E-,uel Co. filed a subsequent case, \vhich is 
reportPd in 63 Utah, beginning at page 392, and that in 
tht~ second case the period covered by the excessive 
charges as claimed was from l\Iarch 8, 1917, to December 
31, 1917. "\V e \vill ask why was the period jro1n Jl arch 8, 
1917, to Dec. 31, 1917, not included in the first action, 
ll'h ich 1ua.s not filed until1919? In the second Jeremy Fuel 
action, which covered the period from 1Iarch 8, 1917 on, 
thP FuQl Co. filed its petition with the Public Utilities 
Commission, wherein it "asked for reparations" cov-
ering the period following l\1arch 8, 1917. 
The statute as originally enacted and as worded at 
the time of the second Jeremy case, merely allowed repa-
rations where charges were made'' in excess of the sched-
ules, rates and tariffs on file with the Commission" or 
"?here the carrier had "discriminated under said sched-
ules against the complainant. * * *" See Section 19, Chap-
ter 47, I.Ja\vs of Utah, 1917. Because of the fact that the 
carrier had not charged rates "in excess of schedules, 
rates and tariffs on file," reparation \vas denied, and it 
\vas apparently assumed by all concerned that there was 
no common law right which could be then invoked . 
.1\.fter the case of Denver & R. G. W. R. Co. v. Pub·-
lic l"'tilities Conzmission, 73 Utah 139,273 Pac. 939 (1928), 
the la\v \vas amended by Session La\\"S of 1929, since \vhich 
time, and at the present time, the statute provides that 
the Commission can grant reparations for charges ''in 
excess of the schedules, rates and tariffs on file \Yith the 
Commission" or where the carrier "has charged an un-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
58 
just, unreasonable or discriminatory amount against the 
complainant.'' Thus, if there were any question before, 
it cannot now be doubted that the power is lodged defi-
nitely in the Commission to the exclusion of any com-
mon law right to have the Commission hear and determine 
whether a carrier has charged any ''unjust, unreason-
able or discriminatory amount,'' and the Commission is 
given power to order that the utility "make due repara-
tion.'' If the reparation order is not complied with, ''suit 
may be instituted in any court of competent jurisdiction 
to recover the same. ' ' 
It is interesting here to point out that since the en-
actment of the Utah Public Utilities Act there has been 
no case (at least this counsel has found none) wherein 
this court has held such a common law right to exist, 
although there have been several where it might prop-
erly have been urged if anyone thought it available, but 
instead, as in the second Jeremy case, relief has been 
sought under the reparations provision of the statute. 
See Jeremy Fuel & Grain Co. et al. v. Public Utilities 
Commission, 63 Utah 392, 226 Pac. 456; Utah-Idaho Cen-
tral Ry. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 64 Utah 54, 
227 Pac. 1025; Denver & R. G. W. R. Co. v. Public Utili-
ties Commission, 73 Utah 139, 272 Pac. 939. 
Other states having statutes similar to the Utah stat-
utes have held that the state statute supersedes and leaves 
no common law remedy available. 
Hewitt Logging Co. v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 166 
Pac. 1153 (Washington). The plaintiff company sued for 
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\vhat it claimed was an overcharge. It had not made any 
previous application to the State Public Utilities Com-
mission. The Washington Public Utilities Act was very 
similar to the Utah Act, including the section providing 
for reparations. The Washington statute also provided 
(at page 1155): 
''This act shall not have the effect to release or 
waive any right of action by the state or any per-
son for any right, penalty or forfeiture which may 
have arisen or may hereafter arise under any law 
of this state.'' 
This provision is practically identical with the pro-
visions of U. C. A. sec. 54-7-23 ( 1). 
In the Washington case there was in addition a 
provision in the State Constitution which re-affirmed all 
common law rights; however, in holding that an applica-
tion to the public utilities commission was a prerequisite 
to any action at law to recover for excessive rates, the 
Supreme Court of the State of Washington said at 
page 1154: 
''We may grant that the Constitution declares 
the common law, but it does not follow that the 
Legislature may not occupy its acknowledged field 
and define procedures and :fix limitations upon the 
assertion of the right preserved. * * * '' 
''To define procedure, to make a condition 
precedent, and to :fix a limitation does not destroy 
the force of the Constitution. On the contrary, a 
law so providing makes it efficient, certain, and 
uniform in its operation. The substantive right 
remains; that is all the citizen can insist upon, for 
it is held, under authority without limit, that no 
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litigant has a vested right in procedure so long as 
his right of action is not abolished.'' 
At page 1156: 
''The claim for the overcharge was not made 
by respondent's assignor within the time fixed by 
law. The condition precedent to the right to sue is 
non-existent. The complaint does not state a cause 
of action.'' 
The State of North Dakota likewise has a statute 
similar, if not identical, to the Utah statute. lVoodrich, 
et al v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 71 F. 2d 732. In this case 
the plaintiffs sought to claim under a common law right 
damages for ''alleged unreasonable, extortionate and 
discriminatory freight rates.'' The court stated that there 
was no claim or allegation in the complaint that the rates 
were not those regularly filed and published with the 
Commission. '' * * * It is the claim of plaintiffs that 
under the North Dakota laws a common law action may 
be maintained to recover damages because of the exac-
tion of unreasonable and discriminatory rates, even 
though such rates be those named in the published tariffs 
of the carrier approved by the Railroad Commission.'' 
In denying this claim and holding that application to the 
Commission for reparation was a. condition precedent, 
the three-judge federal court hearing the case stated at 
page 734: 
''It seems clear that the entire subject of intra-
state freight rates in the state of North Dakota. is 
under the exclusive control of the Board of Rail-
road Commissioners. The powers vested in the 
North Dakota. Board of Railroad Commissioners 
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are even broader and more sweeping than those 
eonferred on the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion. Manifestly, the main purpose of these regu-
latory statutes was to compel the establishment of 
uniform rates for all persons entitled to transport 
goods over the railroads, and to afford convenient 
facilities for ascertaining \vhat are the established 
rates, and to prevent preferences and discrimina-
tions. By the very provisions of the statutPs, the 
carriers are prohibited from collecting from any 
person a greater or less rate than is specified in 
the published schedule. The carrier in this case, 
having adopted, filed, and published schedules of 
rates applicable to the shipments involved, was 
bound to charge and collect that rate and no 
other." 
The Montana Supreme Court has held that under its 
statutes no common law right of action remains, even 
though it also holds that under its state law the state 
commission cannot grant reparations for past charges -
this on the theory that all rates in the state of Montana 
must be set and prescribed by the commission, and hav-
ing been so set by the commission, the commission can-
not grant reparation with respect to rates it has set or 
approved. See Doney v. Nor. Pac. Ry. Co., 199 Pac. 432. 
In spite of the fact that the commission can grant no 
reparations, Montana said that under its statute the 
commission first must be authorized to determine the 
reasonableness or unreasonableness of the rate in ques-
tion and thus an application to the commission is a pre-
requisite, and the ~fontana Supreme Court affirmed the 
lo,ver court in sustaining a demurrer to a complaint 
\vhere application had not been first made to the com-
mission to consider the reasonableness of the rates. 
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The case of Frank A. Graham Ice Co. v. Chicago M. 
St. Ry Co., 140 N.W. 1097, involved a Wisconsin statute 
similar to the Utah statute wherein an action for repara-
tions was filed with the court without ·first applying to the 
state commission. The court in that case refers to the 
various sections of its statute which will bear out the 
comparisons to the Utah statute and says (page 1099): 
''It is plain from the statutes upon the subject 
that the legislature intended to and did pro-
vide an exclusive remedy for the fixing of freight 
charges. 4 4 4 '' 
Page 1101: 
'' * * * The statutes referred to show that the 
whole matter of fixing rates and the remedies for 
excessive charges is lodged with the Railroad 
Commission. * * * '' 
'' * * * The plaintiff had no standing in any 
court for reparation until it first applied to the 
Railroad Commission for relief in the manner pro-
vided by the statutes.'' 
From the various cases cited it will appear that rates 
are sometimes set voluntarily by carriers and sometimes 
by the commission and sometimes, as with Montana, are 
set exclusively by the commission, with the commission 
having no power itself to grant reparations but still 
being required to determine reasonableness. Here we 
would ask, if Utah rates should be considered as being 
required to be set by the commission in all instances, then 
why should we haYe a reparation statute? We have such 
a statute, and some field in 'vhich it may function must 
be found in the fabric of our statutory law. That field 
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('clll only be in instances \vhere tariffs are filed and be-
come effective, \Vhich have not been prescribed by or 
approved by the commission; and in such instances if 
a shipper seeks to attack, then he should do so, after 
sneh rates have been paid, by application under the 
reparations provisions of the statute to allow the com-
mission to do its duty in maintaining uniformity. See 
State v. J>ublic Service Commission of Kansas, 11 P. 
~d 999. 
\V e \vould also like to refer here to the case of A ri-
zona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. 
284 U.S. 370, 76 L.Ed. 348, 52 S. Ct. 183, wherein the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court referred to the Interstate 
Commerce Act but stated law that is applicable to the 
Utah Public Utilities Act, saying at page 384: 
''The Act altered the common law by lodging 
in the Commission the power theretofore exercised 
by courts, of determining the reasonableness of a 
published rate. If the finding on this question was 
against the carrier, reparation was to be awarded 
the shipper, and only the enforcement of the award 
\vas relegated to the courts.'' 
See also Southern Pacific v. R. R. Commission, 231 
Par. 28 (Cal.). 
The only conclusion that can be drawn from the au-
thorities is that under Utah la\v there may be commis-
sion-prescribed rates, and there may be carrier-estab-
lished rates. If such rates as established by a carrier 
either voluntarily or involuntarily are unjust or unreason-
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able, they still have the force of law and before any 
shipper can disregard them or require restitution for 
amounts paid thereunder, the Commission in the first in-
stance must hear a.nd determine the fact of their reason-
ableness and whether they are either excessive, inade-
quate or otherwise; and after such determination by the 
Commission the courts can then enforce any order made 
where the Commission has found reparations to be due. 
The case of Southern Pac. v. Superior Court, 150 Pac. 
397, cited by counsel on page 31 of appellants' brief is 
not in point to the contrary. That case arose under the 
"long and short-haul" clause of the California State 
Constitution, and with respect thereto the California 
District Court of Appeal said at page 403: 
"* * * But the plaintiff's claim in this action 
was that the Constitution of the State of California 
prohibited the defendant from collecting a higher 
freight charge on transportation of goods from 
Oakland to Bakersfield, than the established rate 
for a like kind of goods shipped from Oakland to 
Los Angeles. * * * If the charge was thus in con-
flict with the Constitution, it was a charge beyond 
the jurisdiction of the Railroad Commission. * * • '' 
POINT FIVE 
PLAINTIFFS HAVE NO BASIS IN EQUITY 
FOR ANY RECOVERY. 
Plaintiffs in this action have throughout the pro-
ceedings attempted to avoid any considerations of equity 
at all. At page 20, appellants' brief says, "This is not 
the theory upon which this case is brought at all." Under 
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our law and practice in this day we no longer have the 
di8t inction between law cases and equity cases, and courts 
are required to administer both law and equity in one 
form of action. If the facts show that on equitable con-
siderations plaintiffs are not entitled to recover, the 
courts are required to consider such equity regardiess of 
how plaintiffs try to "duck" it. 
Referring to equity considerations and the duties of 
eourts and commissions, the United States Supreme Court 
said in U n.ited States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. at 191: 
'' * * * Neither body should repeat in this day the 
mistake made by the courts of law when equity was 
struggling for recognition as an ameliorating sys-
tem of justice. * * * '' 
The plaintiffs in this case neither pleaded nor at-
tempted to prove any equity but frankly admitted that 
the charges paid by plaintiffs, for which they now seek 
reimbursement, had been passed on to the plaintiffs' cus-
tomers. ( R. 95 to 98) Very obviously any recovery now 
\vould thus amount to a windfall to plaintiffs, with no 
equitable basis therefor in face of an original and re-
affirming order by the I.C.C. that except for the rates 
charged the defendants had been discriminated against 
and denied needed revenues. 
Appellants' brief on pages 21 and 22 refers to the 
.A.rizona Grocery Co. case, and we refer to the following 
'vording taken from that case, (284 U.S. 384) wherein 
the l~nited States Supreme Court said that the Interstate 
Commerce Act (after which the Utah Act is patterned) 
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'' * * * expressly affirms the common law duty to charge no 
more than a reasonable rate and left upon the carrier 
the burden of conforming its charges to the standard. 
* * * Under section 6 the shipper was bound to pay the 
legal rate; but if he could show that it was unreasonable, 
he might recover reparation.'' The burden thus was on 
the shipper to show that the rate paid was unreasonable. 
Appellants' brief, page 23, referring to the Florida 
case, said that there, 
' ' * * • The shippers were attempting to re-
cover on an equitable basis and not on a legal 
basis. * • • '' 
We ask, where, in either report of such case, can he 
point to for such a conclusion' The case says that after 
the reversal by the Supreme Court, the shippers peti-
tioned the federal court for restitution of the difference 
in rates which they had paid. (295 U.S. at 307) In the 
case at bar plaintiffs filed a complaint in the state court 
asking for restitution of the difference. What reason is 
there to apply equitable principles in deciding the Florida 
case and refusing to apply them in the case at bar' 
The Circuit Court of Appeals in the Structural Steel 
case, 269 F. 2d at 718, referred to alternatives, one of 
which was that in the final event the I.C.C. might not find 
facts to support their past conclusions and that thus their 
findings and report might be prospective only, leaving 
their order unsupported; after which the court 
added: ''in which event the right to prevail would depend 
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upon traditional notions of equity as in Atlantic Coast 
ljiue R. Co. v. Florida.'' 
We submit the plaintiffs are not in equity entitled to 
the relief sought. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiffs confidently urge that the I.C.C. had 
ample jurisdiction to make the investigation and to issue 
findings and an order pursuant thereto. The order as 
issued by it was not void, but under ''such a context'' 
'vas at most voidable as subject to being set aside for 
error in the proceedings through which the I.C.C. had 
exercised its jurisdiction. It was set aside by the Su-
preme Court and the matter remanded for further pro-
ceedings, indicating that the Supreme Court considered 
that the matter was subject to correction in further pro-
ceedings. The order was in force for two years, and valid 
tariffs were filed and maintained ''on file and in effect'' 
for that period of time. While the order was in force 
and in effect before being set aside and while tariffs were 
on file and in effect, the order and the tariffs filed pur-
suant to it had to be complied with under severe penalties 
of la,v. The further proceedings by the I.C.C. have con-
firmed and given support to the prior order. The dis-
crimination has continued to exist over the entire period, 
even though the railroads were unable to collect the in-
creased rates during the period of time after the tariffs 
'vere cancelled (K-36, Exhibit 4) pursuant to the re-
versal and order remanding the matter to the I.C.C. If 
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the rates were in excess of what could have been con-
sidered a reasonable rate during the period they were 
paid, the plaintiffs had ample statutory authority to file 
proceedings with the Public Service Commission of Utah, 
giving that body a chance to pass on the reasonableness 
of the rates and to grant reparation if justified. Defend-
ant submits that the judgment of the trial court should 
be affirmed in toto. 
Respectfully submitted 
BRYAN P. LEVERICH 
A. U. MINER 
S. N. CORNWALL 
WOOD R. WORSLEY 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Respondents. 
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